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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ADDTUR DOES NOT IMPAIR RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL AND IS A PROPER PROCEDURE SUITED TO EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company
(Cal. 1967).
Plaintiff, Jehl, while working as a field man in defendant Southern
Pacific Company's railroad yard, was permanently injured when a
rail car collision caused him to be thrown beneath the wheels of a
moving car. His right leg was amputated, and at the time of trial an
osteomyelitis condition posed a similar threat to the left leg. Jehl
brought an action for personal injuries under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act' and the Safety Appliance Act2 in a state superior court
Nineteen at the time of the accident, plaintiff's projected earnings to
age sixty-five exceeded $500,000. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff totaling $100,000. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the
ground that the damages awarded were inadequate was granted.4
Defendant appealed, contending inter alia, that the trial court should
have given him the option to consent to an additur prior to granting
the motion for a new trial.5 The Supreme Court of California held,
affirmed with directions: the order granting a new trial limited to
damages should stand unless the trial judge in his discretion ordered
an additur. Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company, 66 Adv. Cal. 853, 427
P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1967).
By its unanimous action in Jehl, California's highest court has
clearly authorized additur and determined that such procedure does
not deprive a plaintiff of the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the
1 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
2 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1964).
8 Pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the employee may choose the
forum, state or federal, in which to bring the action. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964). However,
when an action is brought in a state court, the substantive matters are controlled by
federal law and the procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum. Garrett
v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942).
4 CAL. CODE OF CIrv. PROC. § 657 (West 1955).
The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or
vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part
of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the follow-
ing causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision ....
5 The supreme court decided to consider this contention although defendant did not
formally request an additur at trial level. It pointed out that in light of Dorsey v.
Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952), such a request would have been an
idle act. 66 Adv. Cal. at 858-59, 427 P.2d at 991-92, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80. The
failure to perform-an idle act does not constitute a waiver of legal right. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3532 (West 1954); Robinson v. Puls, 28 Cal. 2d 664, 667, 171 P.2d 430, 432
(1946).
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California Constitution or as accorded by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.7 Additur, which has also been called "increscitur, ' 8
was defined by the court as "an order by which a plaintiff's motion for
a new trial on the ground of inadequate damage is granted unless the
defendant consents to a specified increase of the award within a pre-
scribed time." 9
Critical to a discussion of Jehl is an examination of Dorsey v.
Barba.' Until that case was decided in 1952, the California Supreme
Court had never squarely faced the question of whether additur was
constitutionally valid."1 In Dorsey, the plaintiffs brought an action for
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The jury
returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, and the trial court granted
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict, unless the defendant consented to a
specified increase in the amount of the verdict. The defendant con-
sented and the plaintiffs, who did not consent, appealed from the
judgement. On appeal, it was held that the additur resulted in a
denial of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the
California Constitution.' 2 It was not mere formal compliance that
0 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and
remain inviolate ....
7 The court concluded that its holding as to the validity of additur was not changed
because the case was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Act
presented the court with the problem that if the seventh amendment applied to it, the
ordering of an additur in cases brought pursuant to it in the state court would be
unconstitutional in light of the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 239 U.S. 474 (1935). This obstacle was avoided by the court
in relying upon Dice v. Akron, Canton & Y.R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), which
the court interpreted to stand for the proposition that in actions brought in the state
courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the judge-jury relationship is deter-
mined by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, not their inter.
pretation of the seventh amendment. Therefore, the seventh amendment was inapplicable
and the Dimick case should not control. 66 Adv. Cal. 853, 865-67, 427 P.2d 988,
996-97, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 284-85 (1967).
8 McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 19 at 82 (1935).
9 66 Adv. Cal. at 859 n.1, 427 P.2d at 991 n.1, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.1.
10 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
11 Before Dorsey, the California appellate court opinions implied that additur was
valid. 3 WrrKn, CALFORMA PROCEDURE 2094 (1954). See generally Blackmore v.
Brennan, 43 Cal. App. 2d 280, 289, 110 P.2d 723, 738 (1940) (acceptance of the
condition constitutes a waiver by the aggrieved party of his constitutional rights to
resubmit his cause to the jury); Secreto v. Carlander, 35 Cal. App. 2d 361, 364, 95
P.2d 476, 477 (1939) (new trial was granted when the defendant refused to accept
an additur); Adamson v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 P. 52 (1921)
(in a condemnation case additur was allowed where the damages were liquidated or
could be easily ascertained from the evidence). But see, Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668,
674, 107 P.2d 614, 617 (1940) (the supreme court leaving the question of additur
open seemed to recognize its validity had not been finally settled).
12 38 Cal. 2d at 355-59, 240 P.2d at 607-09.
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concerned the Dorsey majority, but the substantive right-that funda-
mental right to have a jury determination of the factual question
of damages. 13
The assessment of damages by the court where they are speculative
and uncertain constitutes more than a technical invasion of plaintiff's
right to a jury determination of that issue. Despite the fact that he
has apparently benefitted by the increase, the plaintiff has actually
been injured, if under the evidence, he could have been obtained a
still larger award from the second jury.' 4
Additur in California after Dorsey and before Jehl, was available
only if both parties consented to it.' 5 The rationale of additur by
stipulation was that plaintiff's consent thereto constituted a waiver
of the right to a jury determination of the issue of damages.0 In
reality, the limitations placed upon additur by the Dorsey rule
were such that it ceased to exist effectively in California."
To reestablish additur'8 as an effective judicial tool, the Jehl court
was compelled to overrule Dorsey.' The chief justice attacked the
Dorsey court's strong reliance upon Dimick v. Schiedt,20 a severely
criticized,21 five to four decision2 2 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that additur violated a plaintiff's right to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment of the United States Constitution.as In
3a Id. at 358, 240 P.2d at 609.
14 Id. at 358, 240 P.2d at 608.
3. See Hall v. Murphy, 187 Cal. App. 2d 296, 9 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1960).
16 Id.
17 See Bender, Additur-The Power of the Trial Court to Deny a New Trial on the
Condition that Damages be Increased, 3 CALm. W.L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1967) noting that
it is unrealistic to assume that consent of both parties may be obtained and that on
only two occasions since Dorsey had an additur, entered without the plaintiff's consent,
been appealed in California. The first, Gearhart v. Sacramento City, 115 Cal. App. 2d
375, 252 P.2d 44 (1953) held that Dorsey had settled that the trial court had no
power to make such an order. The other decision, Morgan v. Southern Pacific Co.,
173 Cal. App. 2d 282, 343 P.2d 330 (1959) simply distinguished Dorsey on the
ground that here there was no finding that the verdict was inadequate and lacked the
support of the evidence.
18 See cases cited note 11 supra.
'9 66 Adv. Cal. at 859-60, 427 P.2d at 992, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (1967).
20 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
21 Some twenty-one law reviews criticized the Dimick case; however in one, Note,
21 VA. L. RIv. 666 (1935), the author approved of the result in Dimick, but con-
tended that remittitur also should be declared unconstitutional.
22 The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Stone, and concurred in by Chief
Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.
23 U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of common law.
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Dimick, the plaintiff brought an action in the federal court for per-
sonal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. The trial judge
entered an order granting the plaintiff a new trial unless the defen-
dant consented to an increase in the jury's award of $500 to $1500.
The defendant consented; however, the plaintiff appealed when his
motion for a new trial was denied. The majority reasoned that since
additur did not exist at common law, prior to adoption of the seventh
amendment, its use deprived a plaintiff of his right to a jury trial as
it then existed.24 The rule at common law precluded a court from
increasing the amount of damages awarded by a jury.25 Such premise
was advanced notwithstanding the Court's recognition that the his-
torical origins of remittitur were equally as obscure as those of
additur.2 6 Further, the federal courts had allowed remittitur for
decades and its constitutionality had been upheld by the Supreme
Court on more than one occasion. Hardpressed to overcome this
inconsistency, the Dimick majority sought to distinguish remittitur
from additur by announcing:
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of submitting a remis-
sion of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible support
in view that what remains is included in the verdict along with
the unlawful excess-in that sense that it has been found by the
jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off
an excrescence. But where the verdict is too small, an increase by the
court is a bald addition of something which in no sense can be said
to be included in the verdict.28
Such artificial and tenuous reasoning was strongly criticized by the
Jehl court. In reaching the larger verdict involved in remittitur, it was
pointed out that the jury had rejected all smaller amounts just as
they had rejected all larger amounts in reaching the smaller verdict
involved in additur. In both additur and remittitur something had
been taken from the litigant who was relying on the verdict.2
The court further indicated that the Dimick case should not have
been controlling in any event, since the state court was not bound by
the seventh amendment's reexamination clause.80 That clause, which
24 293 U.S. at 476-82.
25 Id. at 482.
26 See Bender, supra note 17, at 11.
27 See, e.g., Gila Valley, Glove & Northern Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914);
Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pacific
R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886).
28 293 U.S. at 486.
29 66 Adv. Cal. at 860 n.8, 427 P.2d at 992 n.8, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 280 n.8.
30 See, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877); and Walker v. Sauvient,
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states: "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law," is significantly absent from the California constitu-
tional provision 1
The California constitutional right to a jury trial was intended to
accomplish two functions: First, to operate at the time of the trial,
to require the submission of certain issues to the jury; and second,
to operate after the verdict has been rendered, to prohibit improper
interference with the jury's decision. 2 In moving for a new trial on
the ground that the jury's determination of damages is inadequate,
a plaintiff is not asking for the constitutional protection of his right
to have a jury determine that issue. In making such a motion the
plaintiff should be estopped from raising the constitutional protection
which he has repudiated. Moreover, he should not be permitted to
complain where the court, with the defendant's consent, has increased
the amount of the jury's award. Indeed, the right to a jury trial in
California is historical, 3 and early English and California cases
3 4
indicate that when the constitutional right to a jury trial was estab-
lished it was regarded as protection for those relying upon a verdict,
and not those attacking it.5 In both additur and remittitur the parties
92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (holding that the seventh amendment is not binding on the
states).
81 Compare note 23 supra with note 6 supra. It has been suggested that the reasons
for California's omission of the reexamination clause were that the clause was entirely
different in spirit and effect from the first clause in the seventh amendment, that it
carried the federal Constitution beyond the substance of the common law right to
trial by jury, and that it was declared by the United States Supreme Court in Parsons
v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830) to be "substantial and independent" from the first
clause. 38 Cal. 2d at 370, 240 P.2d at 616 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
82 66 Adv. Cal. at 861, 427 P.2d at 993, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
83 People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P.2d 832, 835
(1951).
It is the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law which is preserved;
and what that right is is a purely historical question, a fact which is to be
ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact. The right is the
historical right enjoyed at the time it was guaranteed by the Constitution. It is
necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the rule of the English common
law upon this subject in 1850.
See also Comment, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 370 (1955). In California the jury trial
guarantee originally was in the Constitution of 1849, Art. I, Sec. 3, but California was
not formally admitted to the Union until 1850. 1 CAL. JUIL 2d xix, xxxii (1952).
84 For a thorough discussion and development of these early English and California
cases establishing the judge-jury relationship as it existed in 1849, see the scholarly
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Traynor in Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d at
364-69, 240 P.2d at 612-15.
85 38 Cal. 2d at 363, 240 P.2d at 611-12 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
These early English and California cases show clearly that when the constitu-
tional right to jury trial was established it was regarded as a protection to
parties relying upon a verdict. Not until today has this court undertaken to
extend that protection to parties who attack a verdict.
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moving for a new trial are not relying on the verdict, they are attack-
ing it, and the constitutional right to complain of additur lies with
the defendant until he agrees to pay more than the verdict, just as the
constitutional right to complain of remittitur lies with the plaintiff,
until he agrees to accept less than the verdict.
Chief Justice Traynor readily acknowledged that additur ultimately
results in an award based on a finding made by the trial judge and
not the jury.36 However, he pointed out, judges constitutionally may,
and do, under appropriate circumstances, determine issues of fact. 7
It is conceded that additur does impinge upon a plaintiff's right to
a new trial as prescribed by Section 657 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, but a defendant has been subjected to the same
limitation by the practice of remittitur for over one hundred years.88
Moreover, the reasons that prevent constitutional guarantees from
yielding to modern procedures promoting efficiency and economy are
not present where a purely statutory right is concerned. 89 Neither
additur nor remittitur is primarily involved with a plaintiff's or
defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial since in every applicable
situation each has had that right in the first instance. What is in-
volved is the procedural and statutory right to a new trial and the
limitations that may be placed upon that right in the name of the
efficient administration of justice.
Probably the strongest argument in favor of rejecting Dorsey is
based on Jogic and fairness. As Chief Justice Traynor has remarked,
-[t]o hold remittitur constitutional and additur unconstitutional is
not only illogical-it is unfair."40 Even the majority in Dorsey ad-
mitted that, "[t] here may be no real distinction between the powers
to increase and decrease an award of damages. '41 Both additur and
remittitur are conditional orders issued by the trial court to bring the
verdict within permissible bounds. Additur is conditioned upon the
defendant consenting to an increase in the verdict, while remittitur
36 66 Adv. Cal. at 862, 427 P.2d at 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
37 The court gives such examples as admitting andexcluding evidence, determining
the suffidency of pleadings,. the interpretation of documents, and the quasi-judicial fact
finding found in equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, bankruptcy, and administrative
proceedings.
38 See, e.g., George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365 (1851) (plaintiff's consent authorized
remittitur and defendants could not complain, because the judgment stands for but
one-half the amount, for which the verdict of the jury was rendered).
39 38 Cal. 2d at 365-67, 240 P.2d at 613-14 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
40 Id. at 368, 240 P.2d at 614-15 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
41 Id. at 359, 240 P.2d at 609.
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is conditioned upon the plaintiff consenting to a reduction in the
verdict. Thus both involve the question of whether the trial court
has the power to alter the amount of damages awarded by the jury.
The conclusion is inescapable:
[I] n neither does the jury return a verdict for the amount actually
recovered, and in both the amount of recovery was fixed, not by the
verdict but by the consent of the party resisting the motion for a
new trial.42
The practical considerations of additur are evident, and are the same
as remittitur. Often at the termination of lengthy and costly litigation
one or both of the parties is dissatisfied with the amount of the
verdict. To require a new trial in every case where only the amount
of the verdict was in question was not only dilatory but an added
expense to all concerned. It became obvious that a more expedient
device was required; thus, as a means of achieving this end, and to
secure substantial justice by bringing the litigation to a more speedy
and economical conclusion, the practices of remittitur and additur
were developed.4 3
The Dorsey case was an obstacle to the efficient administration of
justice in California, and with the constant increase of civil litiga-
tion4 it was destined to be overruled. Moreover, serious doubt was
cast on the efficacy of the Dorsey decision by the sound and pursuasive
dissenting opinion written by Justice Traynor in that case. It was the
substance of that dissent which emerged as the foundation of Jehl,
with Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for a unanimous court, estab-
lishing as law that which he proclaimed in dissent some fifteen years
earlier.
The old familiar saying seems peculiarly applicable: "What is
sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander"; if remittitur is allowed,
so must be additur.
DAVID W. AULT
42 293 U.S. at 494 (dissenting opinion).
43 See generally Comment, 40 CArIF. L. REv. 276 (1952); Comment, 44 YALE L.J.
318 (1934).
44 In ehl, the court notes that just since 1952, the year Dorsey was decided, the
total dispositions in ordinary civil litigation increased more than four times by the year
1964. 66 Adv, Cal, at 860-61, 427 P.2d at 993, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
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